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children, or in retaliation for abuse (Barnett et al., 1997; R. P. Dobash et al., 1998; S. Miller, 2001; Rajan & McCloskey, 2007). Some researchers have also found that abusive men, aware of the mandatory or preferred arrest law, call the police themselves to make sure they are perceived as the victim; they may even self-injure to ensure that their partner is arrested (S. Miller, 2005).

When injuries are serious and obvious, the police must arrest whoever appears to have inflicted those injuries. To reduce the risk of an IPV victim being arrested along with a perpetrator, however, many jurisdictions have enacted **primary aggressor laws**, which require responding officers to distinguish the party who initiated the aggression from the party who likely acted as a defensive response to that aggression, and offensive injuries from defensive injuries (Hirschel & Deveau, 2016). Today, at least 34 states have adopted primary aggressor laws (Hirschel & Buzawa, 2013). A study by Finn and her colleagues found that police officers said they would be less likely to engage in dual arrest if their department encouraged arrest of the primary aggressor only (Finn, Blackwell, Stalans, Studdard, & Dugan, 2004). Research evaluating the impact of primary aggressor laws on dual arrests supports this finding; dual arrests decline significantly following the enactment of primary aggressor laws or once police receive special training on identifying primary aggressors when responding to a domestic violence call (Dichter, Marcus, Morabito, & Rhodes, 2011; Meloy & Miller, 2011). In a study of factors that influence officers' likelihood of making an arrest in an IPV case, Hirschel and Deveau (2016) found that the existence of a state primary aggressor law had a greater impact on officers' decision making than the presence of injuries or the perpetrator's use of a weapon. However, these researchers also found that the existence of the state primary aggressor law lowered the chances that either party would be arrested. They concluded that "an unintended consequence of a state enacting a primary aggressor law is that officers may be deciding to arrest neither of the involved parties instead of determining who the primary aggressor is" (p. 16). If this conclusion bears out after further testing, the police response to IPV may be becoming more similar to what it was prior to the enactment of mandatory and preferred arrest laws.

Identifying the primary aggressor and avoiding dual arrests that include the victim is a significant justice issue. Research shows that female IPV victims who are arrested and processed as offenders fare rather poorly in the court system. Many of the women, for example, are unfamiliar with the court process, have limited knowledge of their options, and cannot afford to hire an attorney so they have to rely on the assistance of a public defender, who may have little experience with IPV cases. They are frightened and want to get the case over with so they can just go home. Consequently, instead of opting for a criminal trial where they can present evidence of self-defense, they accept a guilty plea without fully understanding that they will now have a criminal record that could, among other things, prevent them from working in certain jobs, cause them to lose federal benefits, and have the conviction held against them in a custody hearing (S. Miller, 2005).

IPV victims arrested and convicted as perpetrators are also likely to be mandated to a batterer intervention program (BIP). Given that the majority of victims are women, that women and men typically use force differently in intimate relationships, and that most BIPs are designed to treat abusive men, the content and treatment approach of the programs are usually inappropriate for women (Larance, 2018; Meloy & Miller, 2011). This does not mean that these women cannot benefit from treatment, but rather that the content and treatment approach must be specifically designed to meet